The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians'decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.
Out of the 223,571 physicians active in France in 2016 as recorded by the Statistical O¢ ce of the Health Ministry (DRESS), 47,4% were self-employed, and another 10,8% operated under a mix of self-employment and contract based services.
1
There is no ex-ante allocation of patients to physicians; patients are free to choose their physician. In particular, in the market for specialists, patients will search for the physician that best matches their expectations. A similar search process can be observed with respect to newcomers in a city who search for a general practitioner. This paper aims to analyze how trade frictions can alter the equilibrium fees posted by specialist physicians in a decentralized market for medical services, and to identify the implications for patient welfare, given the speci…c organization of the French health care sector.
Since 1980, self-employed specialist physicians in France have been allowed to choose between performing their medical practice in a heavily regulated "sector 1" or under the much looser regulation in "sector 2". 2 In 2014, 43% of the specialist physicians were working in sector 2, and this proportion is steadily increasing.
3
Fees charged by physicians in sector 1 are determined by the National Health Insurance in an agreement with physicians, and they are covered in full.
The …rst part of the fee is covered by the universal public insurance (better known as the "Social Security") up to a predetermined amount. The remaining amount is covered by complementary insurance as provided by several private insurance companies, to which more than 96% of the population had access in 2010. 4 Physicians working in sector 2 can freely choose their medical fees. According to Article 53 of the Public Health Law, they should set their fees with "a sense of measure". Nonetheless, fees charged in sector 2 are increasing every year; in 2014, the premium charged in sector 2 compared to sector 1 represented on average of 23 euros/medical care, which is 35,7% of the total fee. In general, patients will pay for the di¤erence between the fee in sector 2 and the fee in sector 1 from their own pockets, although private insurance can also cover part of it (Clerc et al., 2012) .
Moving from sector 1 to sector 2 is an important decision for the physician. In addition to the possible negative impact on the number of forthcoming patients, moving to sector 2 comes with additional costs. Access to sector 2 is restricted to physicians with a proven high skill level, as attested by experience or prestigious degrees. Furthermore, physicians in sector 1 receive a subsidy for their contribution to the retirement system which is not granted to physicians in sector 2. Finally, sector 2 physicians will in general bear some higher "representation costs", such as a better location or a more expensive o¢ ce.
As more and more physicians chose to move to sector 2, patient associations are complaining that …nding a doctor in sector 1 has become extremely hard, and that the excessive fees charged in sector 2 make access to medical care increasingly di¢ cult. 5 These worrisome trends prompted in 2013 the Health Ministry and the National Health Insurance to encourage physicians in sector 2 to sign special agreements (referred to as Contrats d'Accès aux Soins), where they voluntarily agree to cap their fees (on average) and in turn receive additional bene…ts. These contracts further evolved in 2017, and are now referred to as OPTAM (Option Pratique Tarifaire Maitrisée) agreements.
6
While this scheme is relatively complex, in brief, physicians can agree to charge fees that are at most twice the fees in sector 1 for a predetermined percent of their service. In turn, private complementary insurance is allowed to cover these "moderate" fees in full.
This paper uses an equilibrium search model to analyze the choice of sector and price decisions of self-employed physicians, and the consequences of these choices for patients. The use of a search model appears as a natural choice, as the information acquisition costs are quite high in the market for medical services, in particular for those services that involve complex diagnostic and treatment procedures (Rochaix, 1989; Mehrez et al., 1995; Emons, 2001) 7 .
Patients are assumed to be heterogenous with respect to their willingness to pay for the medical service and search for the best medical o¤er in a sequential mode. Physicians decide on the sector of activity. Furthermore, should they chose sector 2, they must decide on the best fee level.
The key policy variable is the regulated fee in sector 1, which traditionally has been a subject of controversy between the patients'association, the medical unions, the National Health Insurance and the government. The model presents several pure strategy equilibria that can be ranked with respect to patient welfare. In many cases, physicians can extract a signi…cant part of the patients' surplus. Dunn and Shapiro (2014) revealed that in the US, medical fees are higher in areas where the spatial concentration of physicians'is higher. Our model shows that trade frictions can increase the market power of physicians even if the market concentration is low. This model will allow us to shed some light on the consequences of imposing caps on the sector 2 fees as recently implemented in France.
As a limitation of this short paper, the quality of the medical service is assumed to be invariant.
An extension which would allow for a heterogenous health care quality could be developed along the lines of the equilibrium search model with price and quality di¤erentiation by Besancenot and Vranceanu (2003) . In addition, in building the model we assumed that the cost of moving from sector 1 to sector 2 is identical for all physicians. If physicians have di¤erent costs form moving from sector 1 to sector 2 the model could generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where some physicians choose the sector 1 and the others chose the sector 2. However, in this more realistic setting the essential decision on whether physicians in sector 2 post high or low fees would be guided by the same rationale as in the simpli…ed setting.
2 The model
Main assumptions
We consider the market for a given medical service. The problem features a unit mass of patients and a unit mass of physicians. In line with classical assumptions in the literature, patients engage in a sequential search process, meeting one physician per period (McCall 1971) . We assume that search costs are merely the psychological cost of delaying the cure process, and involve a discount factor < 1. In the context of medical services, this discount factor incorporates the probability that the disease aggravates quickly and can thus be very low in some speci…c situations. In this dynamic context, patients optimally determine a "reservation fee". They will accept all o¤ers charging a fee lower than this reservation fee and keep searching at least one more period if the fee exceeds the reservation fee.
As a consequence of di¤erences in preferences, perceptions, health insurance coverage or income, patients di¤er in their willingness to pay for a medical service (Nay et al., 2016) . It goes beyond the purpose of the paper to study the determinants of this willingness to pay. We assume that there are type-H patients characterized by a high willingness to pay H and (1 ) type-L patients with a low willingness to pay L . Let p j be the reservation fee of the type-j patient, with
Physicians can chose between practising in the "regulated" sector 1 and in the "free" sector 2.
We assume that the medical service has the same quality regardless of the practitioner. This is a plausible assumption if one takes into account the pure medical service, as a patient should obtain the right treatment regardless of the sector. However, the paper abstracts from the possibility of horizontal di¤erentiation, where physicians in sector 2 can provide better nonessential services, such as better comfort during the waiting time, a reduced waiting time, etc.
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Let p denote the fee charged by physicians. This fee depends on the sector, the prevailing regulation, and the optimal choice of the physician. In the general framework, we assume that in sector 1, the medical fee is determined by the National Health Insurance in agreement with physicians, and will be denoted p: In France, this regulated fee p is fully reimbursed to the patient by the Social Security and complementary private insurance.
In sector 2, physicians freely determine the fee 9 . Depending on the "target" patients (low or high willingness to pay), they should set as an optimal price either the reservation price p L ; or the reservation price p H : They have no reason to set a fee lower than the reservation fee because patients of a given type would accept the higher reservation fee. The public and private health 8 Such second-order di¤erences can also justify di¤erences in medical fees, in a horizontal di¤erentiation model. 9 We will study later on the constraints on fees in sector 2 insurances will cover a fraction (1 ) of the di¤erence between the sector 1 fee and the actual fee. In general, > 0; thus patients must pay from their pockets the di¤erence (p p).
The instantaneous utility of a type-j patient who accepts the physician's o¤er p is:
In sector 1, the o¤er is p = p; thus u
The production cost of the medical service is normalized to zero. Physicians who chose to work in Sector 2 must bear some additional costs, both …xed (related to degrees and certi…cations) and variable (such as the higher social contributions and the higher representation costs). To keep the model simple, we discard the additional …xed cost and consider that there is only a constant cost t per patient.
Let s denote the frequency of physicians who choose to work in sector 1. Thus, (1 s) is the frequency of physicians who chose to work in sector 2.
Let l denote the frequency of physicians in sector 2 who post the low fee p L ; thus; (1 l) is the frequency of physicians in sector 2 who post the fee p H . 
Reservation fees
At each period, patients can …nd either a physician in sector 1 o¤ering the regulated fee p (with frequency s); a physician in sector 2 posting the low fee p L (with the frequency l(1 s)); or a physician in sector 2 posting the high fee p H (with the frequency (1 s)(1 l)):
To determine the reservation fee of the type-L patient, we acknowledge that the patient must be indi¤erent between accepting that o¤er and obtaining the associated instantaneous utility, or rejecting that o¤er and "obtaining" the discounted expected utility from an open sequence of similar searches. Denoting by V L (p) the value function of the type-L patient, his reservation fee (p L ) must verify the indi¤erence condition:
This result is obtained by acknowledging that the type-L patient who gets an o¤er (p H ) continues to search insofar as the posted fee exceeds his reservation fee. Given the de…nition of the reservation fee, his discounted expected utility from the search activity is equal to (
The implicit de…nition of the reservation fee is:
Obviously, p L > p; the reservation fee of L-type patients is higher than the regulated fee in sector 1.
Following a similar reasoning, and denoting by V H (p) the value function of a type-H patient, his reservation fee p H must verify:
Replacing p L p by its expression in Eq (3), we obtain:
Both spreads p In other words, if the coverage rate increases, this pushes up the two reservation prices. Because this variable is not essential for the model, in the following we will assume that = 1; i.e., the patient covers from his pocket the whole di¤erence between the sector 2 fee and the sector 1 regulated fee. Then, the two reservation prices have the expressions:
Equilibria
In this game, physicians present three possible pure strategies. We list below these strategies and the associated net payo¤ (y): We recall that t represents the (constant) marginal cost that physicians who choose sector 2 must bear.
Strategy 1 : Work in sector 1 (and charge the regulated fee p). The expected net income associated with this strategy is:
Strategy 2 : Work in sector 2 and charge the low fee p L : This o¤er can be accepted by all patients.
The net income is:
Strategy 3 : Work in sector 2 and charge the high fee p H : This o¤er can be accepted only by the H type patients, which represent only a proportion of all patients. The expected net income is:
We can show that the game presents three pure strategy equilibria. The last row indicates the patient surplus for each equilibrium, determined as:
If the cost t is too large, either strategy 2 or both strategies 2 and 3 cannot be equilibrium strategies. If t is too small, strategy 1 cannot be an equilibrium strategy. For the sake of parsimony we will analyze only the most general case where all strategies are feasible, which requires the cost condition: Table 2 presents the order of critical fees depending on the parameter ; which, we recall, represents the proportion of type-H patients. Obviously, depending on ; we have three cases:
Discussion
We now analyze the most plausible case where the number of patients with a high willingness to pay is not very large
The other cases are not very di¤erent, they just extend the range of p for which the sector 1 equilibrium is feasible, and thus extends the scope for multiple equilibria. 2. If p 2 < p < p 3 ; the game presents a typical con…guration of multiple equilibria; both pure strategy equilibria in which all physicians choose sector 2 (and either set the fee p H or the fee p L )
can occur.
In fact, for p 2 < p < p 3 the game also features a mixed strategy equilibrium where all physicians
The equilibrium l 0 can be inferred from the condition y 2 (p L js = 0) = y 3 (p H js = 0): After some calculations, its expression is:
We can observe that dl 0 =d p < 0; and that l 0 = 1 for p = p 2 and l 0 = 0 for p = p 3 : If this equilibrium prevails, the higher the regulated fee p; the greater the proportion of physicians (1 l 0 ) that will post the high price p H :
3. If the Health authority aims to make sure that the "bad" equilibrium p H is ruled out for sure, they should impose a fee (slightly) above
: 10 In this case, physicians 4. Policymakers might aim to make sure that the sector 1 equilibrium, ensuring the largest patient surplus, is also feasible. For so doing the government should push the regulated price up to
: Such a higher regulated fee is not innocuous, as it would increase the total budget of the National Health Insurance, and the taxes needed to …nance it.
5. Unfortunately, for p p 1 both equilibria that serve the whole patient market are feasible and, on pure theoretical grounds, it is di¢ cult to state which of the two will prevail. One intuitively appealing re…nement is Pareto-dominance, where we can assume that physicians will prefer the equilibrium where they obtain the highest pro…t. If all physicians choose sector 1, their pro…t margin is y 1 ( p) = p; if all work in sector 2 and post
Because L t > 0; this criterion for equilibrium selection suggests that the sector 2 equilibrium is most likely to prevail.
In general, systems with multiple equilibria are highly unstable, as changes in patient beliefs, themselves related to the economic outlook of the sector or to policy reforms, can prompt physicians to move from one strategy to another. Our simple model cannot capture the dynamic of change. Furthermore, the assumption according to which all physicians present the same cost of moving from sector 1 to sector 2 explains why pure strategy equilibria are prevalent. Should we relax this assumption and allow the cost t to follow a standard statistical distribution, the same logic would allow the emergence of equilibria with a proportion 0 < s < 1 of physicians choosing sector 1. 
Conclusion
The market for medical services in France has an original two-sector structure. Physicians working in sector 1 must charge a "regulated" fee determined by centralized negotiations between the National Health Insurance and physicians'unions, while physicians working in sector 2 can freely decide on their fees. Specialized physicians can choose the sector in which they perform their medical practice. Potential patients can freely choose their physicians, and when needed, they undertake a standard search process for the best o¤er. This paper introduces a simple equilibrium search model to analyze the dual market for specialist physicians in France. Search models explicitly take into account the cost of producing price information in decentralized markets. Our analysis revealed that this market organization is prone to multiple equilibria with the inherent instability related to these analytical structures. In this context, changes in patients'beliefs can result in large swings of physicians from one sector to another, and even changes from a low to a high fee equilibrium.
We studied in depth the case where the proportion of patients with a high willingness to pay is relatively small. The analysis shows that there is a regulated price that rules out the most ine¢ cient equilibrium where all physicians charge a very high reservation price. For this particular regulated fee, physicians still make positive pro…ts as they prefer to work in sector 2 (but post a low fee). If the Health authority wants to make possible the best equilibrium from the patients' perspective where all physicians work in sector 1, then it must raise the sector 1 regulated fee even further. Unfortunately, these higher fees do not guarantee the emergence of sector 1 equilibrium.
The steadily increasing proportion of physicians opting for sector 2 as observed over the last thirty years in France can be interpreted as a slow transition from the sector 1 equilibrium to the sector 2 equilibrium, inherently reducing patient welfare. In light of our analysis, raising the regulated fee in sector 1 might not reverse this trend. Furthermore, caps on the highest fees posted in sector 2 with full reimbursement as recently enforced by the French Health authorities can also be an ine¢ cient measure, as it would prompt all physicians to choose this fees, including those who initially favoured the lower fees.
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